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f!1. A. No. 18917" In Bank. Feh. 7. 194!5.J '\ 
Estate of SAMUEL B. KAUFMAN. Deceased, SECOND I 
CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIENTIST. OF NEW I 
YORK CITY. Appellant. v. HENRY KAUFMAN et 
a1.. Respondent.!!. ,. 
[1] Wills - Bevocation - Dependent Relative Revocation.-Under: 
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, an earlier will'l 
revoked only to give effect to a later one on the supposition: 
that the later one will become effective, remains in effect to 
the edent that the tatter proves ineffectift. '!'he doetrine is: . 
designed to caTTY out the probable intention of the testator,. 
(1J Doetrine of dependent relative revocation, DOtes, II A.L.1 
1401-1410; 1115 A.L.R. 721-72!5. ~PP. "J~o. 26 Oa1..T1I1'. 8M; 18 
B.O.L. 182. I 
Melt. Dig. Befenncea: (1-3, Cll Willa, 1245; [4J Willa, 1262; (6) 
Wills, I 276.-. 
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when there is DO reason to suppose that he intended to revoke 
his earlier will if the latter one became inoperative. 
[2J ld. - Revocation - Dependent Relative Revocation-Applica-
tion.-The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is appli-
cable where the second will is virtuallv identical with the first 
in the disposition of the tMtator's estate and merely changes 
minor details in thl' execution of his testamentary purpose, 
thereby making it clear that the first will wa~ revoked only 
because the second duplicated its purpose and that the testa-
tor would have preferred the first will to intestacy as to a sub-
stantial part of hill pstat<>. 
[S] ld.-Revocatlon-Dependent Relative Revocation-Repetition 
of Dispositive Plan.-,When a testator repeats the same dis-
positive plan in a new will, revocation of the old one by the 
new is deemed inseparably related to and dependent on the 
legal eftectiveness of the new. If the new will fails to give 
eftect to the testator's twice declared purpose, its revocatory 
clause falls, for a testator who repeats his purpose intends to 
confirm and not revoke it, and does not intend to have the new 
will operate as a revolllltion independently of its operation 
as a will. 
[4] ld.-Revocation-Evidence.-In a proceeding for the probate 
of a will executed in another state, a finding that the testator 
intended to revoke the will unconditionally was not supported 
by evidence that he wanted no chang'e in his will" except for 
the naming of a ClIlifornia executor. 
[6J ld.-Construction-With Reference to Circumstances at Date 
of WilI.-For purposes of construing a will, any conclusion 
as to the testator's intention must be considered in the light of 
his knowled!!p at the time he executed the will. 
[6] ld.-Revocatlon-Dependent Relative Revocation-Intent.-A 
testator who died shortly after executing a will in this state 
did not intend to revoke unconditionally an earlier will exe-
cuted in another state naming the sam; church as residuary 
legatee, although be was advised that the new will would not 
be effective unless be lived for 30 days, where nothing he said 
or did indicated that be wanted the legacy to fail if he died 
within that period. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County denying probate of a will. Newcomb Condee, 
JUdge. Reversed with directions. 
Lindstrom .. Bartlett and Ralph G. l.indstNm _ Ap-
pellant. 
GaiHI Bon for Respondents. 
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TRA YNOR, J.-On March ]8, ]940, Samuel B. KaufllWl i 
executed a will in New York. He subsequently moved to , 
California where he executed a new will on April' 30, 1m ".,: 
containing a clause "1, Samuel B. Kaufman, do he~bj: 
make and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament.! 
revoking all former wills." Both wills named identicalpt:r;;~: 
Ions for identical cash bequests and the Second Churehit 
Christ, Scientist, of New York City, as reSiduary legatee.1'he~' 
1941 will named a new, executor. It also directed that"; 
testator's body be cremated; the 1940 will only stated a wish'.;: 
that effect. I~ expressl! provide~, as the 1940 will ~d ~j 
that the specifie legacIes were gIven free of deductIon N~ 
inheritance or estate taxes. It made no express provisiOD. ~ 
as the 1940 will did, that "In the event there is not suftleieiitJ 
amount in my estate to pay' the above requests, I direct riJ1'~ 
executor to divide the proceeds in the proportion as statea j 
above." The testator died on May 2, 1941. On petition 'Of \ 
one of the executors, the 1941 will was admitted to probate.· 
Appellant thereafter filed a petition to have the 1940 will 
admitted to probate, to whieh respondent filed a contest. The. 
present appeal is taken from the judgment denying ., 
1940 will admission to probate. . , 
The respondent contends that there is substantial eviden08 
to support the finding of the trial court that it 'was the in •. 
tention of the testator in executing the 1941 will to revoke; 
the 1940 will unconditionally. The appellant contends that'; 
the 1940 will should be admitted to probate under the doctrine ,:, 
of dependent relative revocation, on the ground that the testa- _-
tor did not intend to destroy the testamentary etIect of the : 
1940 will unless the 1941 will would become wholly effective. 
Before executing the 1941 will, the testator consulted Mr., 
J. C. Seaman, assistant trust officer of the California Trust 
Company, with regard to the company's becoming the execu-.· 
tor of his will. Mr. Seaman testified that after reading the: 
testator's 1940 will "I asked him who he wanted to leave'" 
his property to or if he had any special wish that he wanted : 
eamed out and he said no, that he was perfectly satisfied 
with the testamentary disposition made by it, made by that 
Will; he did not want to make any change. The only ques-
tion that was bothering him was whether his friend and at-
torney, a Mr. Franklin, would want to come out here to 
flualify in the event of his death. He rather thought that • 
Mr. FnDklinwas a busy man and would not want to eome : 
! 
I 
/ 
) 
l"elJ. Ul45 j ES'l'ATJ,; 01, KA U.\<'MAN 
[25 C.2d 854; 155 P.2d 831] 
857 
and he had received a favorable report about our company 
through his relations with the Bank, our parent company, and 
that if Mr. Franklin did not want to act, that he would like 
to have our company. So, at that point I told him there was 
nothing I could do for him, that he better go and see a lawyer 
and hav!.' a new· will drawn or have a codicil drawn and to 
tell the lawyer his story, to seek proper advice. That he de-
clilJed to do. He said he did not want to go and see a lawyer; 
he could not see why I could not fix it up for him. I told him 
that I could not do that, that he would have to seek legal ad-
vice on his problem. After that, why he said-- he went to 
another desk that was not in the office and picked up a pen 
and he said, '1 will just write the name of California Trust 
Company in here and initial it', and I said, '1 don't think you 
should do that. You better go and see a lawyer and get proper 
advice on that.' In addition to that we talked about the fees 
in California and about his coming to California, and so forth, 
and at that point he left and went downstairs and later he 
came back either once or twice-- I don't recall-- and he 
said on the last occasion that he thought he would go and see 
a lawyer, but he did not lmow anYi that he was a stranger 
out here and at that point he asked me if 1 would recommend 
someone, which I did, as I previously related." The testator 
thereafter consulted Mr. Moe M. Fogel, an attorney recom-
mended by Mr. Seaman, who testified; "This Will (indicat-
ing) partly printed and partly written, is the .one he showed 
me, the 1940 Will. 1 asked him what his purpose was, what 
he wanted, and he said he wanted a new Will to be just like 
the old one excepting that he wanted to have a California 
Executor. 1 examined this Will and then asked him to wait 
a moment while I examined the Code. 1 examined the Code 
and found from the Code that if he executed this Will in 
exactly the same terms and revoked the other Will, then he 
would have to live a certain length of time, 30 days, in order 
to make it effective, and I Baid to him, 'if I were you, 1 would 
draw a Codicil to this Will because should you die within 30 
days it would not be effective.' He said, 'No, I want a new 
Will. I don't want a Codicil,' and I drew the Will of 1941. 
There was one other thing which 1 inquired into in the mean-
time. I called Mr. Bruce Taft's office in his presence and 
asked him if the Church was properly designated in the old 
Will and found that it was, and I carned it into that Will. 
I then read the Will to him. I read from a copy and he had 
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the original in front of him in the presence of Mrs. Nadine 
Simkins, my secretary. ~ asked him if this w.as his Last,'Wijl 
and Testament and he sald yes, and 1 asked hIm, 'Do you '.' 
Mrs. Simkins and ,I t~, ac~ as witnesses Y' And he said 31 
~nd ~e executed thIS WIll .m our presence and we executed;}[ 
m h18 p~esence . : " and III the presen,ce of each other ,;:;~, 
I gave hlID the ongmal of the 1941 WIll and a carboneoP1: 
of the 1941 Will, 1 gave him back the original Will of 1940,' 
and he left the office. . • . In about an hour or less he came'· 
back to my office and said that he was distressed at ha~ 
taken" Charles Franklin's name "off as executor-- he, ti\ 
that Mr. Franklin might have his feelings hurt by that hAl' 
been done and that Mr. F::anklin who had been a man whci" '.' ',',J,i 
performed so many sel'Vlces for Mr. Kaufman and that. } 
would not want him to feel that way about it and I said "', 
could be put back on as an Executor if he wanted to come'~Ol#:' 
here, he could come and he said that he was sure he woUfd j 
not want to come but he did want to have him on there 8O'liei 
would feel that he had been mentioned. So we then drew.the' 
Codicil of 1941, the Codicil to the 1941 Will and he declared it; 
to be his Last Will and Testament in due form and we ex&: i 
cuted it, and I believe it has been admitted to probate a1~,1 
ready." ~Ir. Fogel recalled writing on the 1940 will "revoked i 
by reason of change of residence and difficulty to come to Call: I 
fornia and qualify." These words had been partially eraS~ i 
The word "Cancelled" was written on the 1940 will, but lit: 
,.' Fogel did not know who wrote it or when it was written. 
Mr. Fogel further testified that he told decedent he shoul~ 
keep the 1940 will after making the 1941 will. On redireCt 
examination he reiterated that he had told decedent thath~, 
would have to live thirty days to make the residual bequest, 
good, and, on recross-examination, stated that he did not point 
out to decedent any other methods by which he could saf~. 
guard the original will. Mrs, Nadine E. Simkins, Mr. Foge1'~" 
secretary, corroborated Mr. Fogel's testimony that his ~ 
suggestion to decedent was that he make a codicil to the wil1;, 
because that was the simplest way to do it, and that decedent 
replied that "He was not making any particular changes in 
the will except that he should take out his executor." Mrs. 
Simkins saw Mr. Fogel examine the code and heard the con~ 
versation between him and the testator substantially as Yr~ 
Fogel related it. .:: 
[1] Under the .doctrine of dependent relative reyocatio~ 
.) 
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an earlier will, revoked only to give effect to a later one on the 
supposition that the later onewUl become effective, remains 
in effect to the extent that the latter proves ineffective. (Es-
tate of Marx, 174 Cal. 762, 766-767 [164 P. 640 L.R.A. 1917F' 
234) i Blackford v.Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138, 1150-1151, 1175-
1176 [286 N.W. 735]; Oharleston Library Soc. v. Oitizens (('; 
So. Nat. Bk., 200 S.C. 96, 125, 126 [20 S.E.2d 623J; Strong's 
.11Jpeal, 79 Conn. 123, 125-126 [63 A. 1089, 118 Am.St.Rcp. 
138,6 L.R.A.N.S. 1107]; W11bourn v. Shell, 59 Miss. 205, 209 
(42 Am.Rep. 363]; In re Roeder's Estate, 44 N.M. 578, 589 
p06 P.2d 847]; Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425, 429-430 
[194 So. 869] ; In re Smalley, 131 N.J.Eq. 175, 178 [24 A.2d 
515] ; Flanders v. White, 142 Ore. 375, 382-384 [18 P.2d823] ; 
In re Bonkowski's Estate, 266 Mich. 112, 115-116 [253 N.W. 
235]; Oarpenter v. Wynn, 252 Ky. 543, 549 [67 S.W.2d 688].) 
The doctrine is designed to carry out the probable intention of 
the testator when there is no reason to suppose that he in-
tended to revoke his earlier will if the later will. became inop-
perative. (Estate of Marx, 174 Cal. 762, 766 [164 P. 640, L.R.A. 
1917F 234] ; Estate of Thompson, 185 Cal. 763, 773,775 [198 
P. 795]; Blackford v. Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138, 1163 [286 
N.W. 735J; Flanders v. White, 142 Ore. 375, 385-386[18 P.2d 
823]; Rudy v. mrich, 69 Pa. 177, 183 [8 Am.Rep .. 238]; 
In re Roeder's Estate, 44 N.ll. 578, 587 [106 P.2d 847]; Stew-
art v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425, 430-431 [194 So. 869]; In re 
Smalley, 131 N.J.Eq. 175, 177-178 [24 A.2d 515]; Stickne" 
v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 116, 120; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 65 
N.H. 230, 231-232 [19 A. 651, 8 L.R.A. 383] ; In re Appleton's 
Estate, 163 Wash. 632, 640-642 [2 P.2d 71].) The doctrine 
has been invoked in California (Estate of Marx, 174 Cal. 762, 
765-767 [164 P. 640, L.R.A. 1917F 234]; Estate of Thompson, 
185 Cal. 763, 772-776, 786 [198 P. 795]), and is sustained 
by the weight of authority. (See cases colleeted in 62 AL.R. 
1401-1410; 115 A.L.R. 721-725; 68 C.J., Wills, § 483, pp. 799, 
800; 28 R.C.L. 182, 183; 38 L.R.A.N.S. 802; 1 Ann.Cas. 609, 
610; 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.), Bigelow, 154; Page on 
Wills, § 478; Underhill on Wills, § 252; Warren, Dependent 
Re'lative Revocation, 33 HarvL.Rev. 337; Francis T. Cornish, 
Dependent Re'lative Revocation, 5 So.Cal.L.Rev. 273, 393.) 
In Estate of Smith, 140 Cal.App. 508 [35 P.2d 335], on whieh 
respondent relies, the proponent failed to prove the existenee 
of the earlier will w whieh JDipt be nlated a:rrr. dependent 
I 
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revocation. In Estate of Olmstead, 122 Cal. 224 [54 P. 745], I 
the revocation of the will was not connected with the makin..i 
of another will, so it could not be held that the testatori#.~' I 
tenucd the revocation of the will to depend upon the legol :,J'I 
fectiveness of a new will. In Estate of ilIartens, 10 Ca1,~ 
39G [74 P.2d 238], the doctrine was inapplicable, for the ~ ,; 
tator made it clear by his revocation of the paragraph o(h\~n 
will appointing executors and his attempt to substitute:m.s I 
son and daughter in their place that he did not wish the P'~~.I 
sons originally named to serve as executors.:~~~l 
[2] The doctrine is clearly applicable to the facts Of!"J 
present case. The record makes clear the intention oC.. I 
t~ator. H~ di~ n?t change ?is testamentary purpose ~ut~ •. l ~· .. I 
mmor detaIls m Its executlOn, The five cash legacIes ~.~.; 
residue to appellant church constituted the whole of his'~ 
altered testamentary purpose. Since the second will was ~ 
tually identical with the first in the disposition of the testator~ 
estate, it is clear that the first will was revoked only beca~ 
the second duplicated its purpose and that the testator woul4, 
have preferred the first will to intestacy as to a substantijlJ.' 
part of his estate. [3] When a testator repeats the same~' 
positive plan in a new will, revocation of the old one by the 
new is deemed inseparably related to and dependent upon the 
legal effectiveness of the new. (Estate of Thompson, 185 CaL 
763, 775-776 [198 P. 795]; Blackford v. Anderson, 226 Iowa, 
1138, 1162, 1164 [286 N.W. 735]; Charleston Library Soc:y; 
Citizens & So. Nat. Bk., 200 S.C. 96, 125-126 [20 S.E.2d 6231), 
Flanders v. White, 142 Ore. 375, 378, 386 [18 P.2d 823];1 
Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425, 430-432 [194 SO. 869H~ 
Stickney v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 116, 121; Wilbou1'n v. Shell, 
59 Miss. 205, 208-209 [42 Am.Rep. 363).) If the new Wl)J: 
fails to give effect to the twice declared purpose of the testa::' 
tor, its revocatory clause falls, for a testator who repeats ~: 
purpose intends to confirm and not revoke it, and does n~ i 
intend to have the new will operate as a revocation indepena· 
ently of its operation as a will. (Blackford v. Anderson, 22~ 
Iowa 1138, 1158-1159 [286 N.W. 735J; Rud!1 v. Ulric1", 69. 
Pa. 177, 182-183 [8 Am.Rep. 238]; Stewart v. Johnson, 1~21 
Fla. 425,430-431 [194 So. 869) ; Wilbourn v. Shell, 58 )~.: 
205, 208-209 [42 Am.Rep. 363); Flanders v. White, 142 Om: 
375, 383, 386 [18 P.2d 823].) "';, 
[4] The trial court's finding that the testator intend~ ~1 
revoke the 1940 will unconditionally is not supported by ~ i 
,~:; 
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evidence. All the testimony, including the testimony of Trust 
Officer Seaman and of Attorney Fogel and his secretary, 
shows that the testator wanted no change in his will except 
for the naming of a California executor. [5] Any conclu· 
sion as to the testator's intention must be considered in the 
li;rht of his knowledge at the time he executed the will. (Es· 
tate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 f33 P. 751); Estate of Ladd, 94 
Cal. 670 [30 P. 99]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [78 
P.2d 193).) [6] The testator was not advised that he might 
provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable 
bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was depend. 
ent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out 
his bequest, nor was he advised that the same- result would 
follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 
In the light of his twice-declared intention to leave his re..c;idu· 
ary e.c;tate to appellant church, it cannot be held that he' chose 
not to make the revocation conditional or not to have the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation apply. It does not 
appear why the testator chose a new will rather than a codi-
cil. Certainly it cannot reasonably be heJd that he made 
that choice in order t.o invalidate the charitable bequest if 
he aid not live for thirty days. Nothing that he said or did 
indicated that he wanted the $rift to fail if he did not live 
for thirty days. It doe.c; not fonow from the faet that he 
was advised that the new win would not be effective unles."I 
he lived for thirt~, days t.hat he intended that the charitable 
hequest should fail if he died within that period. To so hold 
wonld be to read into the charitable beouest an intentional 
('olldition 'Precedent t.hat t.he t.estator should live for more than 
thirty days There is no evidence t.hat the testator had any 
!':ll('h intention. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to admit the 1940 
will to probate with the 1941 wilJ and eodicfl. 
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Oarter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., eonculTed. 
Responednts' petition for a rehearing was denied .March 
1, 1945. 
